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The term visual field generally refers to everything that 
one sees, in other words, our apprehension of the total in-
stantaneous optical simulation. Among the many constitu-
ents of the visual field, there is usually one at which we 
direct our gaze and that captures our attention: this is a spa-
tio-temporally limited configuration that I will call the vis-
ual target. The term visual context (with respect to a given 
target) may be used to refer to anything else in the visual 
field, other than the target. However, often this term refers 
only to a portion of the field located relatively near the tar-
get and surrounding it to some extent; the context may also 
temporally precede the target, but I will not deal with such 
phenomena here.
Since every target appears in some context, and the same 
target may be set in different contexts, the question arises 
whether (and if so, in what ways) the visual appearance of 
the target is affected by the presence of context. In this pa-
per I will first present a few examples of such contextual 
effects, and will then discuss different general strategies for 
explaining them. The text is mainly expository and intro-
ductory in character, but occasionally provides somewhat 
more detailed conceptual analyses.
There is a fundamental psychophysical distinction be-
tween basic physical (objective) and perceptual (subjective) 
visual attributes of objects. The basic physical attributes 
of visual objects, which can be objectively determined by 
measuring instruments and are independent of observers, are 
their size, shape, orientation, distance, spectral reflectance, 
and the like. The corresponding basic perceptual attributes 
involve the subjective appearance of physical attributes, as-
certained on the basis of reactions of observers, and refer to 
perceived size, perceived shape, perceived spectral reflect-
ance (or color) of the objects, etc. Attributes, both physi-
cal and perceptual, may have one or more dimensions along 
which their values may vary. For example, physical length 
is one-dimensional, whereas color, as perceived, is three-di-
mensional, and different objects have different values on the 
dimensions of hue, brightness, and saturation.
It is obvious that values of perceptual attributes of an ob-
ject depend on values of corresponding physical attributes: 
the perceived size of an object depends on its physical size, 
its perceived shape depends on its physical shape, perceived 
color depends on surface spectral reflectance, etc. The man-
ner of this dependence can be simple or complex. For exam-
ple, the relation of physical length and perceived length is 
relatively simple, since as physical length increases, within 
certain bounds, perceived length increases more or less pro-
portionally. On the other hand, as luminance (the intensity 
of light coming from an object) increases, its brightness 
(perceived luminance) does not increase linearly, but rather 
in a negatively accelerated manner, such as quantified by 
Fechner’s or Stevens’ laws. However, how the perceived 
properties of an object depend on its physical properties is 
not my topic here. Rather, the topic involves situations in 
which the physical attributes of an object, the target, remain 
constant, but its perceived attributes change, not because of 
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any changes in the target itself, but due to changes in its 
context. To the uninitiated, it may seem surprising that such 
effects should exist at all. In our everyday perception, when 
we look at an object, intuitively it seems obvious that what 
we are aware of are just the properties of that object itself, 
and not of something else, beyond the object. However, 
contextual effects do exist, ranging from weak but notice-
able to strong and perplexing, and present major challenges 
to our understanding of the working of perceptual mecha-
nisms and cognitive processes in general. 
Examples of contextual effects
In this section I will present four well-known examples 
of contextual effects, in a somewhat more methodical and 
structured manner than they are usually described. This 
common presentation format is useful for considerations of 
four relevant issues that arise when such effects are stud-
ied: they are physical equality, perceptual equality, type of 
context, and veridicality. The format involves four displays: 
in two of them the targets are physically equal and in two 
they are physically different; in two displays the targets are 
perceived as equal, and in two they are perceived as differ-
ent; finally, in two displays the targets are presented in equal 
contexts and are perceived veridically, and in two they are 
presented in different contexts and are not perceived veridi-
cally, resulting in illusions.
Three aspects of contextual effects will be considered, 
labeled existence, direction, and magnitude. Existence re-
fers to the question whether variation of context affects the 
appearance of the target or not; in all subsequent examples 
context effects do exist. Direction refers to the manner of 
change induced in the perception of the target by the pres-
ence of different contexts. Magnitude refers to the strength 
of the contextual effect, expressed numerically.
Contextual effects in the perception of size (area)
Panel (a) in Figure 1 contains two targets in the form 
of two physically identical disks. Their appearance is also 
equal, that is, they look the same, or at least very similar in 
size. Panel (b) contains the same two disks, but here they 
are surrounded by a number of other figures, the contex-
tual disks. This figure, known as the Ebbinghaus illusion 
or Titchener circles, is a classical example of a contextual 
effect: although the targets are physically identical, whether 
they are perceived as identical or not depends on the pres-
ence and features of other objects in their surround. When 
they are in the same context, such as when no other objects 
are in vicinity, as in panel (a), the target disks look the same; 
however, when they are in a specific different context, that 
is, surrounded by objects of different sizes, as in panel (b), 
they look as if they had different areas (see e.g. Roberts et 
al., 2005; Rose & Bressan, 2002).
The difference between panels (a) and (b) is not only 
phenomenological (referring to appearances), but also epis-
temological (referring to the relations of appearances and 
reality). In panel (a), appearance is in accord with reality, 
since the disks both are the same and look the same, so that 
the percept is veridical; in panel (b), appearance and reality 
are in discord, since the disks are the same but look differ-
ent, so that the percept is illusory.
There is more to be said about the appearance of the 
two target disks, in addition to just stating that there exists 
a context effect, meaning that they look different. Namely, 
the context effect has a particular direction: the target disk 
surrounded by larger contextual disks looks smaller (rather 
than, say, unchanged or larger) than the one surrounded by 
smaller contextual disks. Any theory of this effect would 
have to explain why the effect of context has manifested 
itself in this particular direction.
Furthermore, the difference in appearance of the tar-
gets also has a certain magnitude. That is, it makes sense to 
ask how much smaller one target disk looks than the other. 
A complete theory should be able to predict not only the 
direction but also the magnitude of the perceptual effect. 
However, the question concerning magnitude is not readily 
answered. By casually inspecting the display, all that can 
be said seems to be that one disk looks somewhat, but not 
much smaller than the other.
Figure 1. The effect of context in the perception of size. (a) 
Veridical perception: Disks with physically equal size, set in same 
context, are perceived as equal. (b) Illusory perception: Disks 
with physically equal size, set in different contexts, are perceived 
as different. (c) Veridical perception: Disks with physically dif-
ferent sizes, set in same context, are perceived as different. (d) 
Illusory perception: disks with physically different sizes, set in 
different contexts, are perceived as nearly the same.
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The magnitude of the difference in appearance can be 
ascertained more precisely, but to do that one needs to go 
beyond casual observations and perform psychophysical ex-
periments. Such experiments can take various forms, which 
have different advantages and disadvantages. One popular 
procedure is to adjust the size of one target until it looks 
the same as the other target. This can be done a number of 
times, by several observers, using some technical device, 
such as a computer. If such a procedure is applied to the 
smaller looking target disk in panel (b), the adjustment will 
consist in its enlargement, in order for it to look equal in size 
to the other target disk. Suppose that the average enlarged 
disk is presented in panel (d) of Figure 1. In this display 
the target disks are different but they look equal, or at least 
more similar in size than the target disks in panel (b), which 
are actually physically equal. However, when the contex-
tual disks are removed from this display, such as in panel 
(c), the two target disks do look different, in accord with 
their physical difference. Thus context can not only make 
physically equal objects appear different but can also make 
different objects look equal, which is another example of 
non-veridical perception.
Whereas a presentation such as in panel (b) is useful to 
conveniently demonstrate the influence of context, because 
it is easy to show that the targets are physically the same 
although they look different, when one wants to measure 
the illusory effect, it is more convenient to use an experi-
mental procedure, such as resulting in panel (d). Here the 
illusion is measured by comparing the physical sizes of the 
target disks. In particular, the radius of the target disk sur-
rounded by larger contextual disks is 20% larger than the 
radius of the other target disk; this number is a quantitative 
measure of the magnitude of the illusion. Expressing the il-
lusion measure in relative values, such as in percentages, is 
more appropriate here than expressing it in absolute values, 
such as in millimeters, because absolute measures depend 
on the size of the printed page and on the computer screen 
zoom level.
Note that with this method the magnitude of the con-
text effect is measured in a setup in which it is manifested 
in illusory perceptual equality despite physical difference. 
One could also attempt to assess the context effect in the 
converse situation, when it is manifested in perceptual dif-
ference in spite of physical equality, as in panel (b). The 
problem is that in that case one would have to ask observ-
ers to quantitatively judge the difference in appearance be-
tween the two targets, which is a difficult and unreliable task 
(‘how much larger does one disk look than the other’). The 
task is easier and the data are more reliable when observers 
are asked to perform a simpler perceptual judgment, such as 
whether two targets appear equal, and then the experimenter 
performs quantitative measurements on the corresponding 
physical attributes of targets (‘how much larger is one disk 
than the other’), since relative magnitude is much more eas-
ily ascertained for physical attributes than for perceptual at-
tributes.
The displays in Figure 1 provide illustrations of the main 
form of the Ebbinghaus illusion. Various parameters of this 
basic figure can be manipulated, such as size and number of 
the target and contextual elements, as well as their shapes, 
colors and mutual distances. Measuring how the strength 
of the illusion depends on these features can help us un-
derstand the cause of this phenomenon. However, it is not 
my purpose in this paper to provide detailed information of 
this type (see e.g. Roberts et al., 2005, and Rose & Bressan, 
2002). 
In the following I will present three more classical ex-
amples of context effects. They will be displayed in the 
same format as Figure 1, in order to stress the great formal 
similarities between them as contextual effects, although 
they deal with different attributes and types of contexts. The 
accompanying text will be shorter, because the main gen-
eral conceptual issues are common to all effects and were 
already discussed above. 
Contextual effects in the perception of size (length)
In the example in Figure 1, the notion of size referred 
to areas of two-dimensional figures. Context effects exist 
also for the perception of length of linear extents. An ex-
ample is the Müller-Lyer illusion, one of the best known 
phenomena in visual perception. Figure 2, using the same 
Figure 2. The effect of context in the perception of length. (a) Ve-
ridical perception: lines with physically equal lengths, set in same 
context, are perceived as equal. (b) Illusory perception: lines with 
physically equal lengths, set in different contexts, are perceived 
as different. (c) Veridical perception:  lines with physically dif-
ferent lengths, set in same context, are perceived as different. (d) 
Illusory perception: lines with physically different lengths, set in 
different contexts, are perceived as nearly the same.
20
TODOROVIĆ, Context effects in visual perception, Review of Psychology, 2010, Vol. 17, No 1, 17-32
format as Figure 1, shows how lines of same length, which 
when presented on featureless background look the same, 
as in panel (a), appear to have different lengths if additional 
short lines forming chevrons (V-shaped patterns) are added 
at their endpoints as context, as in panel (b) (see e.g. Greene 
& Nelson, 1997; Post et al., 1998; Howe & Purves, 2005).
Similarly as for the Ebbinghaus illusion, one can try to 
make the lines appear equal by making them physically dif-
ferent. The result of such an attempt is presented in panel 
(d). When the chevrons are removed, as in panel (c), the two 
lines clearly look different, which indeed they are.
The direction of this effect is such that inward pointing 
chevrons make lines appear shorter than outward pointing 
chevrons. The magnitude of the effect can be established 
by determining the ratio of physical lengths of perceptually 
equalized lines. In panel (d), the physically longer line is 
25% longer than the physically shorter line to which it looks 
similar in length.
Contextual effects in the perception of orientation
Figure 3 presents the Zöllner illusion, which demon-
strates the effect of context in the perception of orientation. 
The five diagonal lines in panel (a) are mutually parallel. 
In panel (b), additional short lines are present, such that the 
diagonal lines 1, 3, and 5 are crossed by short lines of one 
orientation, whereas lines 2 and 4 are crossed by short lines 
of another orientation. In such a context, the diagonal lines 
do not look parallel any more (see e.g. Kitaoka & Ishihara, 
2000; Morgan & Casco, 2000).
In panel (d), the diagonal lines 2 and 4 are rotated slight-
ly counter-clockwise, and as a consequence all lines now 
appear parallel, or at least more aligned with each other than 
the lines in panel (b). Without the crossing short lines, as in 
panel (c), it is easily seen that the long lines are not mutu-
ally parallel.
The direction of this effect can be ascertained as follows. 
When two lines cross they form four angles, and the oppo-
site pairs of angles are equal; I will refer to the smaller angle 
as `the angle` between the crossing lines. The geometry of 
the display in panel (b) is such that the angle from the di-
agonal lines to the short crossing lines is oriented counter-
clockwise for lines 1, 3, and 5, and clockwise for lines 2 and 
4. The perception of the display is such that the diagonal 
lines do not look parallel, but as if rotated away from the 
short lines, that is, lines 1, 3, and 5 clockwise and lines 2 
and 4 counter-clockwise. The magnitude of the effect can 
be measured by the angle subtended by the directions of 
lines 1, 3, 5 and lines 2, 4 in panel (c) or (d), and it amounts 
to 4 degrees. Expressing this value in terms of percentages, 
as was done for the previous two effects, would not be ap-
propriate, because angles are cyclical measures; it is also 
not necessary, since angles do not depend on the size of the 
display.
Contextual effects in the perception of lightness
Figure 4 presents the simultaneous lightness contrast ef-
fect, a phenomenon that goes back at least to Goethe early in 
the 19th century, and has been studied in detail since (see e.g. 
Kingdom, 1997; Gilchrist, 2006). The two target squares in 
panel (a) are positioned on the same background and have 
equal luminance, that is, they reflect physically the same 
amount of light into the observers` eyes. Phenomenologi-
cally, they also appear to have much the same color, or gray 
level. However, when they are put on different backgrounds, 
one dark and the other light, such as in panel (b), their per-
ceived gray levels are no longer the same.
In panel (d) an attempt was made to change the lumi-
nance of the target on the light background such that it ap-
pears the same as the target on the dark background. An 
ideally satisfactory perceptual match is hard to achieve for 
displays of this type, but at least it can be said that the two 
targets here look more similar in lightness than the two 
physically equal targets in panel (b). However, when they 
are put in the same context, that is, on the same background, 
as in panel (c), they appear different in lightness, in accord 
with the fact that their luminances are different.
The direction of the effect is such that the target on the 
light background looks darker than the same target on the 
Figure 3. The effect of context in the perception of orientation. 
(a) Veridical perception: lines that are mutually parallel, set in 
same context, are perceived as mutually parallel. (b) Illusory per-
ception: lines that are mutually parallel, set in different contexts, 
are not perceived as mutually parallel. (c) Veridical perception:  
lines that are not mutually parallel, set in same context, are per-
ceived as not mutually parallel. (d) Illusory perception: lines that 
are not mutually parallel, set in different contexts, are perceived 
as nearly mutually parallel.
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dark background. The determination of the magnitude of the 
effect is more involved here than in the previous examples, 
because it would necessitate the use of specialized instru-
mentation to measure the amount of light reflected by dif-
ferent surfaces. According to the graphical program that was 
used to construct these displays (in which black is denoted 
as 0% and white as 100%), in panel (d) the target on the 
dark background has a gray level of 50%, whereas the target 
on the light background has a gray level of 75%. However, 
these values, although monotonically related to luminances, 
are not linearly proportional to them, and the perception of 
the targets is likely to be affected differently when they are 
presented on different computer screens or printed on dif-
ferent printers.
Formal definition of context effects
There are many more examples of effects of context, but 
these four will suffice for the purpose of this paper. Based 
on their format, here is one way to define the effects of con-
text in visual perception more formally and generally. Sup-
pose that there are two targets, T1 and T2, which share the 
same physical, objective target attribute OT, such that OT1 
= OT2; examples are two disks of same size (Figure 1), two 
lines of same length (Figure 2), two (or more) lines of the 
same orientation (Figure 3), and two gray patches of equal 
luminance (Figure 4). Suppose that the targets are embed-
ded in two corresponding contexts, C1 and C2, which differ 
in the value of an objective context attribute OC, that is, OC1 
≠ OC2; examples are contextual disks of two different sizes, 
chevrons of two different angles, crossing lines of two dif-
ferent orientations, and backgrounds of two different lumi-
nances. By definition, a contextual effect exists if the ob-
jectively equal targets, set in different contexts, differ in the 
value of a perceptual, subjective target attribute ST, that is, 
if ST1 ≠ ST2; examples are two equal disks perceived to have 
different sizes, two equal lines perceived to have different 
lengths, two (or more) parallel lines perceived to have dif-
ferent orientations, and two equal gray patches perceived to 
have different gray values. Fully formally, a context effect 
exists if the following set of conditions holds: {OT1 = OT2, 
OC1 ≠ OC2, ST1 ≠ ST2}
The above definition is based on context effects as ex-
emplified in the (b) panels of Figures 1- 4. A definition 
based on the (d) panels is also possible: a context effect ex-
ists for the following set of conditions {OT1 ≠ OT2, OC1 ≠ OC2, 
ST1 = ST2}. These definitions deal only with the existence of 
context effects, and involve statements of equality and dif-
ference of visual attributes. The specification of the direc-
tion of context effects, which usually involves statements 
concerning ordinal comparisons of visual attributes, will be 
addressed later on.
Explanatory strategies for contextual effects
What is the explanation of the effects of context in visual 
perception? Why do the perceived attributes of targets not 
depend solely on their physical attributes, but are also af-
fected by other parts of the visual field? There is no single 
answer to such a broad question. Many explanations have 
been offered for various context effects in the literature, but 
there is still no consensus for quite a few effects. In fact, 
there seems to be no general consensus as to what constitutes 
an acceptable explanation, since different researchers adopt 
different frameworks within which explanations are formu-
lated. Here I will outline three such general frameworks or 
explanatory strategies.  This classification is tentative and 
not exhaustive, and the strategies are not necessarily mu-
tually incompatible but are rather, ideally, complementary. 
However, they do reflect interestingly differing styles of 
thought, or different scientific philosophies that researchers 
tend to adopt as favorite ways to approach the problems of 
context, or indeed perception in general.
I will label the three approaches as the psychophysical, 
the physiological and the interpretational explanatory strat-
egy. In the psychophysical strategy the explanation is for-
mulated in terms of features of the stimulus, and the stress 
is put on how the physical input to the visual system relates 
to the perceptual output. The physiological strategy prefers 
accounts couched in terms of neuronal reactions and neural 
interactions, that is, the stress is on the structure of the ef-
Figure 4. The effect of context in the perception of lightness. (a) 
Veridical perception: patches of equal luminance, set in same 
context, are perceived as equally light. (b) Illusory perception: 
patches of equal luminance, set in different contexts, are per-
ceived as differently light. (c) Veridical perception: patches of dif-
ferent luminance, set in same context, are perceived as differently 
light. (d) Illusory perception: patches of different luminance, set 
in different contexts, are perceived as nearly equally light.
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fect that the stimulus exerts on the visual nervous system. 
Finally, the interpretational strategy seeks to understand 
these phenomena in terms of somewhat higher-level, in-
telligence-like processes, such that the stress is on various 
mental or computational strategies that observers apply to 
the deliverances of the senses in order to interpret them, and 
in this way to correctly reconstruct some aspect of their en-
vironment.
Within each of these strategies there are many different 
concrete explanatory accounts. Here I will consider only one 
rather simple proposal per strategy, and concentrate mainly 
on accounts of the simultaneous lightness contrast effect. 
The three proposals have quite different ‘explanatory fla-
vors’, but all may initially seem reasonably plausible. When 
discussing them, I will first briefly point out their positive 
aspects, but will then concentrate on outlining various limi-
tations and difficulties of these proposals, and, in some in-
stances, how they may be overcome. 
An example of the psychophysical strategy: the contrast 
account
In this approach the appearance of the target is explained 
in relation to the features of the stimulus. There are many 
ways in which such accounts may be formulated. The type 
of explanation that I will devote my attention to here is an 
account in which context effects are explained by invok-
ing the notion of the contrast of the target and the context. 
For example, in this approach the Ebbinghaus illusion is 
explained by noting that one target disk is surrounded by 
larger disks, and in contrast to them appears smaller, where-
as the other target disk is surrounded by smaller disks, and 
in contrast to them appears larger. Similarly, the explanation 
of the simultaneous lightness contrast effect, indicated in its 
very title, is that the two gray patches look different because 
they contrast with their respective backgrounds, which is 
why the one on dark background appears lighter, and the 
one on light background appears darker. 
What can be said about this type of account? On the one 
hand, such a proposal has several appealing features. For 
example, it is general, since it appears to be applicable for 
qualitatively different attributes, such as size and lightness. 
Furthermore, such an account is predictive and falsifiable, 
in that for a given target and context one can, in principle 
at least, deduce which consequence the physical relation of 
context and target should have for the appearance of the tar-
get according to the contrast account, and then test whether 
that prediction comes true. In addition, a contrast account 
seems to have face validity, since it appears intuitively plau-
sible that physical features of objects may be perceptually 
evaluated in comparison with and in relation to analogous 
features of nearby, related objects.
On the other hand, there are quite a number of aspects 
in which the contrast explanation is limited or problematic. 
Before addressing them, I will elaborate one way in which 
this notion can be made more formal, based on the above 
definition of context effects. Recall that in situations such as 
presented in the (b) panels of the figures, the objective at-
tributes are equal for the targets (OT1 = OT2), but are different 
for the contexts (OC1 ≠ OC2). To express the direction of this 
difference, this nominal statement must be expressed ordi-
nally.  If the objective attributes are one-dimensional (such 
as size or luminance), one of these values must necessarily 
be smaller and the other larger, and I will arbitrarily assume 
that this value is smaller for the first context, that is, that 
OC1 < OC2 holds; for example, in the Ebbinghaus illusion, 
this means that the size of one set of contextual disks (C1) 
is smaller than the size of the other set of contextual disks 
(C2), and in the simultaneous lightness contrast display, 
this means that one background (C1) has lower luminance 
than the other background (C2). I will define contrast to be 
present if the value of the relevant perceptual, subjective at-
tribute ST1 of the target T1 is larger than the corresponding 
value of the attribute ST2 of target T2, that is, ST1 > ST2 holds. 
Formally, contrast is defined by the following set of condi-
tions: {OT1 = OT2, OC1 < OC2, ST1 > ST2}. For the Ebbinghaus 
illusion, this means that the target disk (T1) surrounded by 
smaller contextual disks (C1) looks larger than the physi-
cally equal target disk (T2) surrounded by larger contextual 
disks (C2); for the simultaneous lightness contrast displays, 
this corresponds to the situation in which the target (T1) on 
the low luminance background (C1) looks lighter than the 
equi-luminant target (T2) on the high luminance background 
(C2).
Another definition of contrast can be based on the (d) 
panels in the figures, expressed in the following set of con-
ditions: {OT1 > OT2, OC1 < OC2, ST1 = ST2}. In this case, as it 
was shown in the examples, the magnitude of the effect can 
be determined in different ways, for example by computing 
the ratio OT1/OT2 and expressing it as a percentage, or by 
computing the difference OT1 - OT2.
Let me return to the first definition of contrast, given 
by the conditions {OT1 = OT2, OC1 < OC2, ST1 > ST2}. Sup-
pose now that again OT1 = OT2 and OC1 < OC2 hold, but that 
ST1 = ST2. This set of conditions refers to cases of absence 
of context effects, because although the contexts are differ-
ent, the perceptual attributes of the targets are equal. More 
interestingly, note there is a third possibility, and that is that 
again OT1 = OT2 and OC1 < OC2 hold, but that ST1 < ST2; such a 
possibility can indeed be perceptually realized and is called 
assimilation. To summarize, context effects for one-dimen-
sional attributes involve two targets with physically equal 
attributes (OT1 = OT2), and two contexts such that for one 
context the relevant physical attribute is smaller than for the 
other (OC1 < OC2). One type of context effects is contrast, in 
which the direction of the perceptual difference of the tar-
gets (ST1 > ST2), is opposite to the direction of the physical 
difference of their contexts, and the other type is assimila-
tion, in which these two directions are equal (ST1 < ST2). In 
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contrast effects the perceived attributes of the targets can 
be said to shift away from their contexts and become more 
different from them, whereas in assimilation effects the per-
ceived attributes shift towards their contexts and become 
more similar to them (examples corresponding lightness 
phenomena will be discussed below). 
In standard demonstrations of contrast, the value of the 
physical attribute of the target (OT) is often intermediate 
between the corresponding values of the context, that is, 
OC1 <OT< OC2. Thus in the Ebbinghaus illusion the target 
disks are smaller than the surrounding disks in one context 
and larger than the surrounding disks in the other context; 
similarly, in the simultaneous lightness contrast effect, the 
luminance of the target patches is usually in between the lu-
minances of the two backgrounds, that is, it is an increment 
with respect to C1, but a decrement with respect to C2. It is 
an empirical question, which I will not pursue here, whether 
and to what extent context effects exist when the value for 
the target is not intermediate but rather higher or lower than 
the values for both contexts, that is, when OT < OC1 < OC2 or 
OC1 < OC2 < OT.
An interesting issue in the study of context effects is the 
existence of neutral contexts, symbolized here as CN. These 
are contexts for which it can be shown or reasonably as-
sumed that they do not affect the appearance of targets, that 
is, that STN does not depend on OCN, and thus CN can serve 
as an appropriate baseline or control condition. If such a 
context exists then, in addition to comparing the effects of 
C1 and C2 with each other (yielding the contrast relation ST1 
> ST2), one can also compare separately the appearance of 
the two targets in contexts C1 and CN (yielding the relation of 
ST1 and STN), and in contexts C2 and CN (yielding the relation 
of ST2 and STN). For example, in the Ebbinghaus illusion the 
neutral context CN for the targets might be constituted by 
the condition in which the target is presented isolated, with 
no contextual disks surrounding it (similar as depicted in 
Figures 1a and 1c for both targets). Comparisons of the ap-
pearance of the target surrounded by small contextual disks 
(C1) with the target alone (CN), and of the target surrounded 
by large contextual disks (C2) with the target alone (CN), can 
yield several possible outcomes that may clarify the source 
of the contrast effect.  For example, the perceived size of 
the target in the neutral context (STN) might be smaller than 
when it is surrounded by smaller disks (which can be labeled 
as the ‘inflating effect of small disks’, STN < ST1), and also 
larger than when it is surrounded by larger disks (‘shrinking 
effect of large disks’, STN > ST2), yielding the overall rela-
tion ST1 > STN > ST2. However, it might also be the case that 
only the inflating effect exists, ST1 > STN = ST2, or that only 
the shrinking effect exists, ST1 = STN > ST2, or even that both 
non-neutral contexts induce inflation, but that the inflation 
effect is stronger for smaller contextual disks, ST1 > ST2 > 
STN, or that they both induce shrinking, but that the shrink-
ing effect is stronger for larger contextual disks, STN > ST1 > 
ST2. Similar considerations apply for other illusions.
One problem here is to decide which control condition is 
legitimate. For example, in the Ebbinghaus illusion, in ad-
dition to the empty context condition, another candidate for 
a control condition is one in which the context is not empty 
and the target is surrounded by contextual disks, but they 
have the same size as the target disk. In the Müller-Lyer illu-
sion, control conditions might be constituted by lines without 
any chevrons, or by ‘chevrons’ constituted by perpendicular 
lines. In the Zöllner illusion, control conditions might be 
constituted by diagonal lines without any crossing lines, or 
by crossing lines oriented at right angles to diagonal lines. 
Finally, in the simultaneous lightness contrast display (in 
which it would be of interest to study whether the different 
appearance of the targets in Figure 4b is due to a ‘darken-
ing effect’ of the high luminance background, a ‘lightening 
effect’ of the low luminance background, or both, or even 
whether both contexts work in the same direction but with 
different strengths), the problem is that it is not clear how 
to construct a fully adequate neutral context. In this case, in 
contrast to the previous three, it is not possible to construct 
an ‘empty context’, because the luminance of the surround 
is the relevant contextual attribute, and the target always has 
to have a surround of some luminance and color; even zero-
luminance backgrounds would not correspond to colorless 
but to black contexts, which are not necessarily neutral. 
Let me now return to the general assessment of the con-
trast account. One of its shortcomings is that it provides 
only a qualitative prediction of the direction of change of 
appearance of the target, but does not, in its basic form, pre-
dict the magnitude of that change. It appears plausible that 
larger differences between the target and the context should 
be associated with larger effects on the target, but this is an 
empirical issue, not dealt with in the contrast account, at 
least as defined above.
A very important limitation of the contrast account is 
that, as defined, it only strictly applies to single-valued con-
texts. For example, in the simultaneous lightness contrast 
effect, it is presupposed that in each context the background 
has a single, uniform luminance. In the Ebbinghaus illusion, 
although such an approach does not prescribe the number 
of surrounding context objects (in fact, this number is an 
important independent variable in the study of this illusion), 
it does presuppose that they are all of the same size, either 
larger or smaller than the target. Thus an important chal-
lenge for the contrast account is to handle situations with 
multiple-valued contexts. In the Ebbinghaus illusion, this 
involves cases in which the target object is surrounded by 
objects of different sizes, a situation that apparently has not 
been studied much. In the study of lightness, these are cases 
involving complex backgrounds, such that the target is sur-
rounded by two or more surfaces of different luminances, 
some of which may be higher and others lower than the 
target luminance; furthermore, such surfaces may have dif-
ferent areas and may be located at different distances from 
the target, some adjacent to it and others not in immediate 
contact with it.
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One reasonable way to generalize the contrast account 
so that it becomes applicable to multi-valued contexts is to 
propose that the appearance of the target is the resultant of 
some kind of average contrast effect of all constituents of 
the context, weighted, say, by their area and distance from 
the target. However, there are phenomena in lightness per-
ception that are difficult to explain even within a general-
ized contrast approach, and thus strongly challenge it. The 
first such effect was discovered by Max Wertheimer and 
described by Benary (1924). More recently, a more salient 
example was studied by White (1979) and many other au-
thors.
Figures 5a and 5b present a related example of an effect 
problematic for the contrast account (after Todorović, 1997). 
The targets are the cross-shaped gray patches at the center 
of these figures, denoted as A and B. The targets have the 
same luminance, but cross A looks somewhat darker than 
cross B. The two figures share the same geometry, but cross 
A is positioned on a white background and is surrounded by 
a quartet of black squares, whereas cross B is positioned on 
a black background and is surrounded by a quartet of white 
squares. Note that the portion of the border that the crosses 
share with the adjoining squares is two times longer than 
the portion of the border they share with their backgrounds. 
This means that a generalized contrast account, in which 
the effect of the different parts of the context is proportional 
to the length of the border shared with the target, should 
predict that the lightness of the targets is to a larger extent 
determined with reference to the luminance of the squares 
quartets than with respect to the luminance of the back-
grounds. Thus according to this prediction cross A, adjoined 
by twice as much black than white, should look lighter than 
cross B, adjoined by twice as much white than black; The 
problem is that in fact A looks darker than B. This lightness 
effect is not very strong, but it is intriguing, because, simi-
lar to the Wertheimer-Benary effect and White’s effect, to 
which it is structurally related, it has the ‘wrong’ direction, 
from the standpoint of the contrast account of lightness (see 
also the discussions of this effect in Palmer, 1999; Blakeslee 
& McCourt, 1999; Howe, 2001; Todorović, 2001; Güçlü & 
Farrel, 2005; Ghosh, 2006). 
How can the challenge to the contrast account provided 
by these and related phenomena be met? One possibility is 
to give up on the usefulness of contrast as an explanatory 
notion in lightness perception, and search for some other 
principles. Another possibility is to keep this notion but to 
restrict its domain of application. One idea is to assume that 
the context within which the contrast account applies is not 
equivalent to the whole visual field other than the target, 
but only to a particular portion of the target surround. In 
particular, the appearance of targets in Figures 5a and 5b 
could be accommodated within the contrast account if the 
effect of contrast would not apply for the squares but would 
be restricted to the background; in this case, the contrast 
account would correctly predict that the target on the white 
background looks darker than the target on the black back-
ground. The problem is how to properly motivate this re-
striction.
One possibility is to propose that the target may contrast 
only with the part of the visual field with which it groups, or 
to which it is perceived to belong (see Gilchrist, 2006; Ago-
stini & Galmonte, 2002). Note that in Figure 5 the crosses 
may be perceived to belong to the background and not to the 
square quartets. However, an issue with applying the idea 
of belongingness is that it is a phenomenological and not 
a physical concept, that is, it refers to subjective features 
of the percept (describing how some aspect of the scene is 
perceived), and not to objective features of the stimulus (de-
scribing some aspect of the geometry or the photometry of 
the scene). Thus to formulate a proper psychophysical ac-
Figure 5. (a, b) Crosses and squares illusion. Crosses A and B have the same luminance, but cross A looks darker than cross B, although 
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count, one would need to specify, in stimulus terms, under 
what conditions portions of the visual field will be perceived 
to belong to each other. A set of such conditions is described 
by the well-known Gestalt principles of grouping (see e.g. 
Todorović, 2008). However, none of the classical principles 
seems to apply directly for the regions of Figure 5a and 5b.
Another possible account is based on the so-called T-
junctions present in this stimulus, examples of which are 
indicated in Figures 5c and 5d. These are ubiquitous image 
features, present whenever an object partially occludes an-
other object. They are constituted when adjoining portions 
of three regions are delineated by two lines, one labeled as 
the ‘stem’ and the other as the ‘top’, in the form of letter T 
(which may be rotated by any angle). Figure 5a contains, at 
eight locations, T-junctions of the Figure 5c type, in various 
orientations; Figure 5b contains, at corresponding locations, 
T-junctions of the Figure 5d type. Using this notion, one 
can formulate the rule that the target will contrast with the 
portion of the surround positioned along the stem of T-junc-
tions. Such a rule successfully predicts the lightnesses of 
the targets in Figures 5a and 5b (for details, see Todorović, 
1997). Thus T-junctions may serve as inducers of belonging-
ness (see Gilchrist, 2006). However, a T-junction account is 
limited to displays which contain T-junctions, and even in 
such displays other factors may also be at work (see Howe, 
2001; Todorović, 2001). 
Still another possibility is based on the observation that 
the targets in Figures 5a and 5b appear to reside on a differ-
ent depth plane than the square quartets: the squares appear 
to be located in front, whereas the crosses (which may also 
look like gray squares partially occluded by the square quar-
tets) appear as behind, located in the background. There-
fore, one possible way to account for lightness effects in this 
figure is to propose that contrast effects are limited to ob-
jects that reside in the same depth plane (see Palmer, 1999; 
Howe, 2001). However, a problem for this view, pointed out 
in more detail by Todorović (1997, 2001), is that White’s ef-
fect is structurally rather similar to Figure 5 and involves the 
same intriguing lightness phenomenon; this makes it plau-
sible that the two effects should have the same explanation. 
However, White’s figure looks like a mosaic and does not 
involve perceived depth plane differences.
A serious challenge to the contrast account is posed by 
lightness phenomena that appear very hard to accommodate 
within it. Recall that the contrast account predicts that the 
lightness of the target should shift away from its context 
(such as gray appearing darker when surrounded by white 
and lighter when surrounded by black). However, in some 
figures, which exhibit the phenomenon of lightness as-
similation, target lightness shifts toward the context (such 
as gray appearing lighter when surrounded by white and 
darker when surrounded by black). In fact, White’s effect 
and related phenomena can be treated as examples of as-
similation (see Anstis, 2005).
A classical example of lightness assimilation is pre-
sented in Figure 6 (after Helson & Rohles, 1959). Figures 
6a and 6b contain gray stripes of equal luminance, but 6a 
also contains black stripes whereas 6b also contains white 
stripes. Note that according to the contrast account, the gray 
in 6a should look lighter than the gray in 6b; however, to 
most subjects it is the gray in 6a that looks darker (though 
this effect may be less stable than simultaneous lightness 
contrast, and some viewers, including the present author, 
have difficulties to observe it under some conditions). This 
outcome is described by saying that in this case the percept 
of gray assimilates to the context (rather than contrasts with 
it), so that it appears darker next to black and lighter next to 
white, which is the opposite direction to contrast. The prob-
lem for the contrast account is that in cases such as Figure 
6 and similar effects, unlike with the Wertheimer-Benary 
and related phenomena, the option to explain them through 
restricting the effectiveness of contrast to a portion of total 
context does not appear to be available.
Figure 6. Lightness assimilation. Gray stripes in (a) and (b) have the same luminance, but to many observers look darker in (a) than in (b).
a b
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Finally, there is a problem concerning the status of the 
contrast account, in the following sense. When contrast is 
invoked, should that be regarded as a description, a predic-
tion, or an explanation? It does seem appropriate and helpful 
to use it to describe perceptual effects, providing shorthand 
reports of directions of context-induced phenomena in cer-
tain displays. A contrast account can also be useful for the 
purpose of predicting the direction of effects in novel fig-
ures, and as such can serve to formulate hypotheses that can 
be verified or falsified (and are indeed falsified in a number 
of examples discussed above). But it seems less appropri-
ate to use contrast as an explanation, such as claiming, say, 
that a surface is perceived to have a certain lightness level 
because of contrast. The problem is that an explanatory ac-
count seems to require a mechanism, and the contrast ac-
count, as defined above, does not postulate one. These same 
remarks apply to assimilation, or any other purely psycho-
physically defined account. Such accounts are indispensa-
ble for providing lawful input-output relations, describing 
and predicting that certain stimuli lead to certain percepts, 
but there still remains the question why such regularities 
should obtain. In other words, rather than providing expla-
nations, one may view psychophysical accounts as provid-
ing regularities that need to be explained themselves. One 
way to address this type of question is to look for neural 
foundations of psychophysical relations, as exemplified in 
the physiological strategy.
An example of the physiological strategy: the lateral 
inhibition account
When light reflected from a stimulus strikes the cornea 
of the eye, it continues to propagate through several ocular 
tissues until it hits the retina and is absorbed, at which point 
the optical phase of the visual process ends and the neural 
phase begins. From the retina the main visual route pro-
ceeds to a sub-cortical nucleus in the thalamus, and then to 
area V1 in the occipital cortex, from where the signal is dis-
tributed to a number of other cortical visual areas, which are 
generally interconnected with each other in both directions. 
Each of these neural structures consists of several neural 
layers, each layer containing several types of neurons, total-
ing hundreds of millions of cells. This broadly distributed 
neural action eventually leads to the conscious awareness of 
the percept, in a manner which is not yet fully understood. 
Nevertheless, because of the obvious relevance of neural 
processes for perception, many accounts of perceptual phe-
nomena have been couched in neural terms.
An example of the use of the physiological strategy is 
the proposal that many perceptual effects can be explained 
by the process of lateral inhibition (Coren, 1970). This is 
the phenomenon that neurons adjacent to each other in a 
neural layer may send mutual inhibitory signals, in propor-
tion to their own activation. For example, suppose that there 
are two neighboring cells, X and Y, such that X receives 
stronger activation from the stimulus than Y. Since, in addi-
tion to the bottom-up stimulus-based activation, there is also 
mutual lateral inhibition between them, the final activation 
levels of both cells will be lower than if they were isolated 
from each other. Furthermore, since the initial activation of 
cell X is higher, its inhibitory effect on cell Y will be more 
intense than the corresponding inhibitory effect of cell Y on 
cell X.
An account of the simultaneous lightness contrast ef-
fect popular in textbooks (though occasionally with cave-
ats that this probably is not the full explanation) is based 
on the notion of lateral inhibition. Consider the two gray 
target patches in the simultaneous lightness contrast stimu-
lus, presented again in Figure 7a. Because the two patches 
have the same luminance, the neurons stimulated by them 
will be initially activated to the same level, but will then 
be inhibited by adjacent cells which are stimulated by the 
surrounds of the patches. Cells stimulated by the white sur-
round will be highly activated and therefore will send strong 
lateral inhibitory signals to their neural neighbors, whereas 
cells stimulated by the black surround will be weakly acti-
vated, so that their inhibitory signals will be weak as well. In 
consequence, the cells stimulated by target patch B, located 
on the white surround and thus exposed to strong lateral in-
hibition, will in the end have a lower activation level than 
the cells stimulated by patch A, on the black surround. This 
is why patch B looks darker than patch A. Note that this 
explanation is related to a contrast account in which both 
surrounds involve darkening of the target, but the darkening 
effect is stronger for the white surround.
There are several appealing aspects of this explanation. 
It provides a concrete example of the way perception can 
be grounded in neural activity, showing how an intriguing 
visual effect can result as a byproduct of a general physi-
ological principle. Also, it proposes to provide a genuine 
causal account, explaining why it is that one patch looks 
darker than the other. On the other hand, this idea has sev-
eral limitations and problematic aspects, both as an account 
of simultaneous lightness contrast and as a general explana-
tion of lightness effects (see Gilchrist, 2006). I will point out 
a few issues here.
Lateral inhibition was first demonstrated in the eyes 
of horseshoe crabs, which have eyes that are very differ-
ent from the eyes of primates. When this notion is used to 
explain perceptual phenomena in humans, retinal ganglion 
cells of the on-center type are usually invoked. In contrast to 
horseshoe crabs’ eyes, ganglion cells do not seem to directly 
inhibit each other; rather, their receptive fields (portions of 
the retina whose stimulation affects the cells’ firing rate) are 
based on lateral interactions between other retinal neurons. 
It is well known that the receptive fields of on-center gangli-
on cells consist of a central disk whose stimulation by light 
increases the cell’s firing rate, and a peripheral ring whose 
stimulation decreases the firing rate. These receptive fields 
are usually mathematically modeled as differences of two 
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Gaussian curves with equal areas, a tall narrow one for the 
center, and a low broad one for the periphery. It is relative-
ly simple to simulate the reactions of such cells to various 
stimuli. A simulation of the reaction of a set of such cells to 
the simultaneous lightness contrast stimulus is presented in 
Figure 7c. For simplicity, the simulation is one-dimensional, 
that is, it corresponds to a set of cells arranged along a line. 
Figure 7b presents the corresponding horizontal one-dimen-
sional cross-section at mid-height of the luminance distribu-
tion of the stimulus depicted in Figure 7a. This example uses 
1-D cross-sections, but this approach can be extended to 2-
D profiles as well (e.g. in Grossberg & Todorović, 1988, and 
a number of later models in the literature).
The crucial aspects of the neural profile, with respect to 
the explanation of the context effect, are the levels of activ-
ity in sections A and B, corresponding to the target patch-
Figure 7. Illustration of lateral inhibition. (a) The simultaneous lightness contrast effect. (b) Sketch of luminance distribution along the 
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es. It can be seen that the average response in section A is 
larger than in section B. This is in accord with the percept 
that patch A looks lighter than patch B. To that extent, this 
simulation confirms the lateral inhibition account of the si-
multaneous lightness contrast effect. However, it also raises 
some serious concerns. The profile of the neural reaction, 
overall, is not in particularly good correspondence with the 
percept. In the neural output there are prominent oscillations 
corresponding to luminance edges in the stimulus input, 
involving an undershoot at the low-luminance side of the 
edge and an overshoot at the high-luminance side; however, 
the targets as well as the backgrounds are in fact perceived 
as mostly homogeneous surfaces (which indeed they are), 
with perhaps slight, narrow perceptual inhomogeneities at 
the edges, corresponding to Mach bands. Thus the response 
profile corresponds to the percept only in a rough first ap-
proximation, but appears to be in discord with it in many 
details. One way to remedy this problem is to introduce a 
filling-in mechanism that, roughly, performs an averaging 
process within edge-defined boundaries, and in this way 
eliminates the large inhomogeneities present in the profile 
above (Grossberg & Todorović, 1988). Another strategy is 
to introduce neural units with several different receptive 
field sizes (Blakeslee & McCourt, 1999).
A serious problem for the lateral inhibition account, as 
formulated above, is that although it may provide the neural 
basis for pure contrast effects, it is less suitable for explain-
ing other lightness phenomena. Thus it has difficulties to 
account for the Wertheimer-Benary effect, White’s effect, 
assimilation, and related phenomena. 
A specific difficulty for the physiological strategy for 
explaining lightness phenomena is that currently there are 
few actual physiological data on these effects. One reason is 
that many neurons respond poorly to large homogeneously 
colored surfaces. However, a single cell recording study in 
monkeys (Rossi et al, 1995), using a simultaneous lightness 
contrast display, found that a subset of neurons in cortical 
area V1 showed activity levels that were in correlation with 
the human lightness percept. On the other hand, an fMRI 
study in humans by Cornelissen et al. (2006) found no cor-
relation of recorded activity and percepts. In contrast, Per-
everzeva & Murray (2008) observed a close relationship 
between the fMRI signal and the amount of perceived light-
ness induction.
Finally, an important and rarely considered challenge for 
the physiological strategy is to spell out in more detail the 
relation between neural activity and conscious perception. 
In physiologically based accounts the stress is usually on 
the ‘stimulo-neural’ aspect, that is, how the incoming stimu-
lus is processed in the visual nervous system. However, a 
complete explanation should also include the ‘neuro-phe-
nomenal’ aspect, that is, how neural activation maps onto 
corresponding percepts.
In particular, the above account presupposes that strong-
er activation of neurons corresponds to higher levels of per-
ceived lightness. Note, though, that the simulated neurons 
belong to a special class, the on-center ganglion cells. The 
retina also contains off-center ganglion cells, whose recep-
tive fields have inverse structure, compared to on-center neu-
rons. In consequence, for such cells the simulated response 
profile to the simultaneous lightness contrast stimulus has 
a shape similar to Figure 7b, except that it is inverted. The 
correspondence is not exact, because off-center cells are not 
complete mirror images of on-center cells (Chichilnisky & 
Kalmar, 2002). However, the main point is that in the off-
center cell profile the activity level corresponding to target 
A would be lower than for target B. If higher activity of off-
center cells would correspond to higher levels of perceived 
lightness, then the output of off-center cells would be di-
rectly opposed to the simultaneous lightness contrast effect. 
Another possibility is that increased activity of off-center 
cells corresponds to increased perceived darkness, that is, 
decreased lightness levels (see Baumgartner, 1961). In this 
case their signal would not be in conflict but rather in accord 
with the signal of the on-center cells, with respect to light-
ness. Some empirical support for this notion is provided by 
studies that show that blocking the on-center cell activity 
results in deficits in registering light increments but not 
light decrements (Schiller, 1992). However, note that both 
on-center and off-center retinal neurons belong to very early 
levels of the visual system. We do not know the activity of 
which cells in the brain correspond to perceived lightness. 
To mention two extreme possibilities, is there a specific sin-
gle class of final-level ‘lightness neurons’ in some cortical 
area, or is lightness perception based on distributed activity 
of many different types of cells throughout the visual system 
(see Todorović, 1987)?  Such issues are still far from clear, 
and they are part of the largely unsolved general question 
of the relation of neural activity and conscious awareness, 
or, in philosophers’ talk, the ‘mind-body problem’. We may 
hope that a combination of careful phenomenology, sophis-
ticated psychophysics, and ever-advancing neuro-physi-
ological techniques may shed more empirical light on this 
perplexing and intriguing matter.
An example of the interpretational strategy: the illumi-
nation interpretation account
The optical signal that arrives at our eyes carries infor-
mation about the outside world. However, due to various 
factors, this information is often ambiguous or distorted. 
Nevertheless, our perception of the world is usually accu-
rate. One possible conclusion from this is that there exist 
perceptual mechanisms that operate upon the distorted input 
information and interpret it in light of additional available 
information or accumulated experience, thus providing us 
with more reliable knowledge about our surroundings. It has 
been suggested that many illusions are consequences of in-
appropriate applications of such interpretative mechanisms 
(Gregory, 1963). Such an explanatory strategy (which could 
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also be labeled as the cognitive strategy) postulates the ex-
istence of various quasi-intelligent, reasoning-like mecha-
nisms to explain the illusory appearances.
A well known example involves the effects of linear per-
spective. According to the laws of geometrical optics, the 
size of the projection of an object upon the retina depends 
not only on its physical size but also on its distance from the 
observer; in consequence, objects of the same physical size 
but at different distances project images of different size on 
the retina. If our judgments of their objective size would rely 
only on their projective size, we would often make gross er-
rors. Since we usually do not make such errors but are able 
to judge sizes of objects relatively independently from their 
distance (a phenomenon known as size constancy), it has 
been concluded that there are perceptual mechanisms that 
interpret the retinal size in view of other available informa-
tion. One such purported mechanism of size constancy in-
volves combining the retinal size of an object with informa-
tion about its distance, and using this information to deduce 
its objective size as a conclusion; it should be noted that 
here the notions such as ‘interpretation’, ‘deduction’ and 
‘conclusion’ are regarded as processes that do not presup-
pose any conscious cognitive operations of the perceiver. 
One popular explanation of the Müller-Lyer illusion, the 
details of which I will not go into here, proposes that such 
a ‘taking distance into account’ mechanism inappropriately 
interprets this configuration as involving perspective cues, 
from which it wrongly deduces that the two main lines are 
at different distances, and, since their projected sizes are 
the same, concludes that they must have different physical 
sizes.
A phenomenon analogous to size constancy is lightness 
constancy. It refers to the fact that in everyday life we en-
counter many objects under different illumination levels, 
but that nevertheless we can usually judge their reflectance 
relatively independently from illumination; for example we 
perceive a piece of chalk as white and a piece of coal as 
black, both under sunshine and in the shadow, although the 
coal in the sun may reflect more light than the chalk in the 
shade. One way to explain such phenomena is to propose the 
existence of a ‘taking illumination into account’ mechanism, 
which combines the information from object luminance 
reaching the retina with the information about object illu-
mination, to deduce object reflectance. The important point 
for the present considerations is that such an illumination 
interpretation mechanism can be postulated to account not 
only for lightness constancy but also for simultaneous light-
ness contrast, in an explanation going back essentially to 
Helmholtz (see Kingdom, 1997). The assumption is that we 
perceive one half of Figures 4b or 7a as well illuminated and 
the other half as in shadow. If this is the case, then it can be 
deduced that the two targets, which have equal luminances 
but are under different illuminations, must have different re-
flectances. Thus the target in shadow (on dark background) 
must be light (though poorly lit), in order to reflect the same 
amount of light as the target under high illumination (on 
white background), which must be dark (though well lit). 
Such an interpretative mechanism indeed correctly predicts 
which target in the simultaneous lightness contrast display 
will be perceived as lighter and which as darker.
This type of explanation has general appeal, because it 
is plausible that in the course of the evolution of the spe-
cies or during the ontogenesis of the individual, organisms 
have developed special strategies for efficient registration 
of important, recurrent features in their environment. Fur-
thermore, this sort of approach has the virtue of account-
ing both for the veridical performances of our sensory ap-
paratus (perceptual constancies) as well as for non-veridical 
outputs (perceptual illusions). Finally, this type of approach, 
although quite different from the physiological strategy, 
shares with it the feature that it is a causal account, aiming 
to explain why perception is the way it is.
The ‘taking illumination into account’ explanation was 
also applied for other lightness effects, such as the one pre-
sented in Figure 8a (after Adelson, 1993). The two regions 
pointed at by arrows are equi-luminant (have the same lu-
minance), but region A looks somewhat darker than region 
B. To explain this, note that there is an impression that the 
object in the figure is illuminated from above, and that its 
shape is such that region A belongs to a row of regions that 
receive stronger illumination than the row of regions to 
which B belongs. From this it can be deduced that region A 
must be darker than region B, in order for the two regions 
to reflect the same amount of light. The postulation of such 
a mechanism, that deduces that of two equi-luminant but 
differently illuminated regions one must be dark gray and 
well lit, whereas the other must be light gray and poorly lit, 
is based on the same reasoning as in the above Helmholtzian 
account of the simultaneous lightness contrast effect, except 
that here it has more face validity, because the impression of 
differential illumination is more salient.
However, a simple change in the geometry of the de-
picted figure puts this explanation into doubt. Compared 
with Figure 8a, in Figure 8b (after Todorović, 1997; see also 
Adelson, 2000), the two bottom rows of the figure are mir-
rored and shifted, so that the rows to which A and B belong 
are now perceived as parallel, and thus should be under 
the same illumination. However, the perceived difference 
between regions A and B in this figure is about the same 
as in Figure 8a, but it does not seem to be explainable el-
egantly by a ‘taking illumination into account’ mechanism, 
as in Figure 8a. From this it follows that the illumination 
interpretation account of Figure 8a is questionable as well, 
because according to it the lightness difference should have 
been eliminated or weakened in Figure 8b, but it was not.
Another example of the application of the illumination 
interpretation explanation, and how it can be questioned, 
is presented in Figure 9 (after Todorović, 2006). Figure 9a 
is a close replica of an image designed by Adelson (1995). 
Patches A and B have the same luminance, but A looks 
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darker than B. This can be explained by noting that patch 
B appears as located within the shadow cast by the cylin-
der, whereas patch A appears normally illuminated. As in 
the previous examples, the logic is that if two patches have 
the same luminance but are under different illumination, 
the one under higher illumination (patch A) must be darker 
than the one under lower illumination (patch B). A pictorial 
counter-argument to this explanation is presented in Figure 
9b, in which the contrast between patches A and B does not 
appear to be much weaker than in Figure 9a. However, it can 
be seen that due to a number of manipulations in Figure 9b, 
described in detail in Todorović (2006), the sense that B is in 
shadow of the cylinder should be heavily compromised. The 
fact that the lightness illusion is not much diminished argues 
against the idea that an illumination interpretation process is 
responsible for it.
The final example of this type is presented in Figure 10 
(after Todorović, 2006). Figure 10a depicts a shape that can 
be described as a curved staircase, painted with a checkered 
pattern. It contains horizontal and vertical parts (‘steps’), 
connected by curved transition regions (‘knees’). The point 
to note is that all patches on the steps indicated by arrows 
(both the horizontal ones denoted by A’s and the vertical 
ones denoted by B’s), have the same luminance, but appear 
to have different lightness. The explanation of this relatively 
strong lightness illusion within the illumination interpreta-
tion account is rather straightforward, and follows the same 
logic as in the previous examples. Observing this figure, one 
gets a clear impression of a curved, checkered surface, il-
luminated such that the horizontal steps receive more light 
than the vertical steps; note particularly that the graded lu-
minance transitions along the knees fit very well within this 
Figure 8. (a) The corrugated Mondrian.  Patches A and B have the same luminance, but A looks darker, which can be explained by the 
illumination interpretation account. (b) The staircase Mondrian. The lightness difference between A and B is similar as in (a), contrary to 
the prediction of the illumination interpretation account.
Figure 9. (a) The checkered shadow illusion. Patches A and B have the same luminance, but A looks darker. (b) Deconstructed checkered 




TODOROVIĆ, Context effects in visual perception, Review of Psychology, 2010, Vol. 17, No 1, 17-32
interpretation. Since the indicated patches have the same 
luminance, it follows that the ones positioned on the hori-
zontal steps must be darker than the ones positioned on the 
vertical steps, and this is indeed what is observed.
Figures 10b and 10c provide challenges to this account. 
Figure 10b contains the same horizontal and vertical steps as 
Figure 10a, but the knees are inverted both space-wise and 
luminance-wise. Inspection of this figure, and particularly 
of the knee luminances, indicates that the same illumination 
interpretation should apply as for Figure 10a. Nevertheless, 
the lightness differences between the A-patches and the B-
patches appear much less salient than in Figure 10a. On the 
other hand, on Figure 10c the knees are only inverted space-
wise (compared with Figure 10a), with the consequence that 
the illumination distribution upon the knees is not optically 
compatible with the illumination distribution upon the steps. 
Nevertheless, the lightness differences appear as salient as 
in Figure 10a (for details see Todorović, 2006).
Conclusion
In this paper I have presented four examples of contex-
tual effects in visual perception, followed by discussions of 
three types of accounts of such effects. The typology of ac-
counts does not pretend to be complete, nor do the accounts 
necessarily exclude each other. However, it is useful to 
consider the differences between frameworks within which 
various theories of these effects and theoretical account of 
perception in general, are often couched. 
A simple example of each of the three types of accounts 
was considered in more detail, and their strong and weak 
points were discussed, with particular stress on the simulta-
neous lightness contrast effect. Although the three example 
accounts (based on contrast, lateral inhibition, and illumi-
nation interpretation) may have initially appeared plausi-
ble, when submitted to more detailed analyses, each was 
shown to exhibit important and instructive shortcomings. 
However, this does not mean that these notions are without 
merit for the explanation of context effects. They can be and 
were embedded as constituents of many complex theories 
of these effects. However, an adequate examination of such 
more encompassing accounts, and there are quite a few, is 
beyond the scope of a brief introductory conceptual over-
view paper.
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